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The role of simulation in
intertemporal choices
Garret O’Connell, Anastasia Christakou and Bhismadev Chakrabarti *
Centre for Integrative Neuroscience and Neurodynamics, School of Psychology and Clinical Language Sciences, University
of Reading, Reading, UK
One route to understanding the thoughts and feelings of others is by mentally putting
one’s self in their shoes and seeing the world from their perspective, i.e., by simulation.
Simulation is potentially used not only for inferring how others feel, but also for predicting
how we ourselves will feel in the future. For instance, one might judge the worth of
a future reward by simulating how much it will eventually be enjoyed. In intertemporal
choices between smaller immediate and larger delayed rewards, it is observed that as
the length of delay increases, delayed rewards lose subjective value; a phenomenon
known as temporal discounting. In this article, we develop a theoretical framework for
the proposition that simulation mechanisms involved in empathizing with others also
underlie intertemporal choices. This framework yields a testable psychological account of
temporal discounting based on simulation. Such an account, if experimentally validated,
could have important implications for how simulation mechanisms are investigated,
and makes predictions about special populations characterized by putative deficits in
simulating others.
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Introduction
Just as our own feelings determine our preferences whenmaking choices for ourselves (Bechara and
Damasio, 2005), our understanding of the feelings of others determines how we predict what they
would prefer (Nicolle et al., 2012). Similarly, we often make choices on behalf of our future selves.
For instance, when choosing between rewards now or for later (known as intertemporal choices),
we might assess the worth of the later reward by predicting how much we will enjoy it in the future
(Loewenstein, 1996). A possible route to predicting the feelings of others or the feelings of our
future selves is by imagining how we would feel in their places, e.g., how a reward would make me
feel then. This mechanism, known as simulation, has been proposed to play a role in predicting the
feelings of others and one’s own self in the future (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Mitchell et al., 2011),
but how these forms of simulation are related remains to be directly investigated. In this article, we
review the experimental evidence for the role of simulation of future selves inmaking intertemporal
choices, and present a heuristic to illustrate its similarity with simulation of others.
Measures and Models of Intertemporal Choice
Preferences in intertemporal choices can be indexed by the temporal discounting task. In this
paradigm, a series of choices between smaller/sooner and larger/later monetary amounts are pre-
sented. The commonly observed response pattern is that the longer the delay of the larger reward,
the more the sooner but lesser reward is preferred. The rate at which rewards are subjectively
devalued as a function of delay slows down as the delays become longer, resulting in a steep-to-flat
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“discounting curve” (Ainslie, 1975). This discounting function
has been associated with intelligence (Mischel andMetzner, 1962;
Kirby et al., 2005; Shamosh et al., 2008) and consequential life
outcomes such as health, wealth and social-functioning (Mischel
et al., 1989; Moffitt et al., 2011).
Several psychological accounts of intertemporal choice have
been proposed, such as ego depletion (Baumeister and Heather-
ton, 1996), hot vs. cool systems (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999),
construal-level models (Fujita, 2008), and empathy-gap models
(Loewenstein, 1996). The model proposed in the current paper
stems from the empathy-gap model, which suggests that dif-
ficulties in empathizing with the feelings of reward belonging
to one’s future self cause rewards to be devalued with delay.
Simulation has been proposed to be an integral component
of empathy, in that it allows us to predict another person’s
mental state by putting ourselves in their shoes (Gordon, 1986;
Shanton and Goldman, 2010).
If simulation is used to infer the feelings of future selves, then
delayed rewards should be preferred less when simulation is low,
as is the case for socially distant strangers. To test this prediction,
63 participants made intertemporal choices from the perspective
of socially close and distant others, as well as from their own per-
spective (O’Connell et al., 2013). We observed that participants
preferred delayed rewards less for socially distant others, than
for socially close others. This reduction in preference for future
rewards for strangers was arguably due to the lower simulation
elicited by strangers compared to one’s self/friends. Additionally,
individuals who scored higher in trait empathy were found to dis-
count less steeply for strangers, suggesting that delayed reward
choices are promoted by dispositional markers related to simu-
lation. In the following sections, we discuss simulation and its
subcomponents in greater detail, and illustrate a potential role
for them in intertemporal decisions.
It is worth noting that this framework operates on a different
level of explanation than value-based computational approaches
to intertemporal decision-making. For example, a previous
framework developed by Pezzulo and Rigoli (2011) also postu-
lates the role of future prospections in intertemporal choices,
but concentrates exclusively on the inputs and outputs of value
computations. Instead, this article focuses on the putative psy-
chological mechanisms that underlie intertemporal choices.
Simulating Future Selves
Evidence from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
studies highlights simulation as a modulator of intertemporal
preferences. In a study by Mitchell et al. (2011), participants
KEY CONCEPT 1 | Intertemporal preferences
An individual’s preference between smaller/immediate rewards or
larger/delayed rewards, as indexed by the temporal discounting task.
were asked to imagine rewarding events now or in the future.
A reduction in activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC, reliably activated when people put themselves in the
shoes of another person; Ochsner et al., 2004) was observed when
thinking about future rewarding events compared to those in
the present. Smaller reductions in this vmPFC response were
associated with greater preference for delayed rewards on a
temporal discounting task a week later. The authors interpreted
this finding to suggest that the extent to which future rewards are
simulated (imagining what it would be like to receive them, as
if available now) is reduced by delay, and these reductions guide
preferences for delayed rewards.
In a similar study by Peters and Büchel (2010), intertempo-
ral choices were presented concurrently with a description of an
event planned by the participant at a similar point in time as the
delayed reward. Cueing participants to think about future states
arguably induced simulation of future selves, and this was found
to increase preferences for delayed rewards.
Lesions studies further suggest the vmPFC’s involvement in
simulating future rewards. In a study by Sellitto et al. (2010),
patients with lesions to the vmPFC (orbital aspect) were reported
to prefer immediate rewards more compared to controls. This
finding is argued to support the vmPFC’s role in imagin-
ing/simulating future rewards, and thus, damage to this region
reduces preferences for rewards that aremore difficult to imagine,
i.e., those further away in the future (Peters, 2011; Sellitto et al.,
2011). Notably, it has been reported that lesions to the vmPFC
also impair the ability to infer another person’s feelings (but not
their beliefs) (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2006; Shamay-Tsoory and
Aharon-Peretz, 2007). Together, these findings indicate the joint
role of the vmPFC in simulating the affective perspectives of both
future selves and other people.
The current proposal that future selves are simulated in
intertemporal decisions dovetails with work on episodic future
thinking, i.e., the imagining of future personal events. A theoret-
ical account from Schacter et al. (2007) proposes that episodic
future thinking involves simulation, in how future events are
imagined by reconstructing past experiences. This account has
been supported by findings indicating an overlap in brain regions
involved in remembering the past events and imagining future
events. For instance, amnesic people with hippocampal dam-
age are disrupted in their ability to episodically imagine future
events (Hassabis et al., 2007; Race et al., 2013). Intriguingly, this
group show normal levels of temporal discounting (Kwan et al.,
2012, 2013; Palombo et al., 2014), suggesting that simulation
mechanisms involved in intertemporal choices are less dependent
on contributions from episodic memory than those involved in
episodic future thinking.
In commonly used measures of episodic future thinking (e.g.,
past-future task; Addis et al., 2008), participants are asked to
mentally construct hypothetical events. Due to the highly spec-
ified level of detail in these events, simulating them potentially
draws on the hippocampal store of episodic memories to provide
ready schemas for constructing these details (Martin et al., 2011;
Addis and Schacter, 2012). In contrast, simulation of future selves
in intertemporal choices might not require such detail to generate
the required signal (i.e., subjective value of choice). In this case,
only the feelings associated with receiving rewards need to be
simulated, without the need to fully construct the episodic details
of the future event in which rewards will be received. This route
would preclude the need for major contributions from episodic
memory systems. Instead, these simulations could rely upon
more generalized affective representations of rewards, possibly
signaled in the vmPFC. This view is supported by evidence for
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the dissociation between systems involved in the cued anticipa-
tion of rewards and episodic memory (Packard and Knowlton,
2002). Consistent with its proposed similarity to intertemporal
choices, the ability to infer the mental states of others is also pre-
served following loss of hippocampal functioning (Rosenbaum
et al., 2007).
Simulating Others
Simulation is a theoretical mechanism for how the thoughts
and feelings of others are inferred, as in Theory-of-Mind (ToM)
tasks (Shanton and Goldman, 2010). It states that to understand
others, we put ourselves in their shoes to see the world from
their perspective. There are two component processes involved
in simulation. In one component, one’s own perspective/belief
state needs to be adjusted to match the perspective of the other
person. A key prediction of simulation accounts is that if one’s
own perspective is not sufficiently adjusted, this will bias pre-
dictions about the perspectives of others toward one’s own, an
error known as egocentric bias. This component of simulation
KEY CONCEPT 2 | Egocentric bias
The extent to which self perspective interferes with the inference of another’s
perspective.
involving suppression of the egocentric bias will hereafter be
referred to as simulation accuracy (SA) which might involve
KEY CONCEPT 3 | Simulation accuracy
The extent to which egocentric bias is suppressed in order to make more
accurate inferences of others’ perspectives.
multiple processes, such as executive function, inhibitory
control, and working-memory. The other component of sim-
ulation describes the extent to which the thoughts and feel-
ings of others are actively embodied in one’s self, and is
hereafter referred to as simulation efficacy (SE). In this
KEY CONCEPT 4 | Simulation efficacy
The extent to which the other’s perspective is simulated as if happening to the
self.
sense, SE is conceptually similar to emotional contagion (Hat-
field et al., 1994). SA and SE can be engaged to different
extents in the same social cognitive task, depending on task
demands. A graphical depiction of these components during sim-
ulation is provided in Figure 1. A challenge for lab-based tests
is to identify proxy processes for each of these components of
simulation.
The SA component of simulation has traditionally been mea-
sured using the “false-belief” ToM task, which requires partici-
pants to suppress their own knowledge in order to infer theminds
of naïve others (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al.,
1985). Another measure of SA is the Director task, in which the
ability to suppress egocentric bias is operationalised as howmuch
participants inhibit the tendency to respond to task instructions
from their own visual perspective, and instead respond according
to the visual perspective of another person (Keysar et al., 2003;
Epley et al., 2004).
SE has been measured using a range of techniques. In
one behavioral approach, it has been shown that observation
of emotion states in others leads to a corresponding bodily
FIGURE 1 | Visualisation of simulation components. Top panel: as SA
increases, the other’s inferred perspective moves from an inaccurate neutral
state (caused by egocentric bias to one’s own neutral state) toward their
actual pain state. Bottom panel: as SE increases, the other’s predicted
perspective becomes simulated in one’s self, leading to increased
state-sharing between self and other (illustrations by Allie Brosh
(hyperboleandahalf.blogspot.com/), published with permission of partial
reprint from artist).
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representation (e.g., facial expression) being activated in the
observer (Niedenthal, 2007). The extent of this bodily mapping
from the expresser to the perceiver is a proposed metric of SE, in
how it also potentially signifies the simulation of others’ affective
states.
This “state sharing” has also been measured using fMRI
techniques. Singer et al. (2004) developed a “self-other pain”
paradigm, in which participants’ neural responses are measured
while they received mild electric shocks, or observe/infer the pain
experienced by another person being administered shocks. Singer
et al. (2004) reported extensive overlap in neural responses to
pain in one’s self, and when observing pain in others. The magni-
tude of neural responses to the pain of others within this overlap
has been positively correlated with participants’ ratings of the
intensity of the others’ pain (Cheng et al., 2007; Saarela et al.,
2007), directly linking this activity to inferences about the other’s
perspective. A similar self-other overlap has been noted when
making reward chooses on behalf of others in the vmPFC (Nicolle
et al., 2012; Suzuki et al., 2012; Janowski et al., 2013; Jung et al.,
2013; Morelli et al., 2015), suggesting that in order to predict
the preferences of others, we simulate them in ourselves. In sum,
neural activity in the self-other overlap when observing/inferring
the perspectives of others appears to denote that aspects of the
others’ experience are being simulated; the SE component of
simulation.
Many investigations of SE have examined the effects of
changes in social perception. Most notably, studies have con-
trasted levels of SE elicited by friends compared to strangers, by
liked compared to disliked others, or by familiar vs. unfamil-
iar others. All of these manipulations effectively alter the social
distance of the simulation target. Social distance is a construct
KEY CONCEPT 5 | Social distance
Perception of another person’s position on a general dimension of social
closeness, encompassing kinship, familiarity, self-similarity, and likeability.
for measuring how close another person generally feels across a
range of dimensions, e.g., how familiar, self-similar or socially
liked a person is perceived to be (Liviatan et al., 2008; Osin´ski,
2009). These dimensions can be considered as proxies for the sub-
jective value of the social target, which modulates the motivation
for social affiliation. Interestingly, the location of others on these
dimensions of social distance is shown to modulate both SA and
SE components of simulation, but in opposite directions.
Effects of Social Distance on Simulation Efficacy
Using the self-other pain paradigm, neural markers of simu-
lation are shown to be more strongly elicited by people per-
ceived as more friendly (Singer et al., 2006), and for loved ones
compared to strangers (Cheng et al., 2010) (see Table 1 for fur-
ther examples). Similarly, neural responses to rewards for oth-
ers in the self-other reward overlap are found to be greater
for socially close vs. distant others (Table 1). Beyond pain and
reward, studies also demonstrate increased neural activity in
regions engaged when reflecting about one’s own thoughts and
beliefs (in the mPFC/vmPFC) when mentalising about those
of socially close vs. distant others (Ochsner et al., 2004; Ames
et al., 2008; Jenkins et al., 2008; Rabin and Rosenbaum, 2012;
Rabin et al., 2013).
Perceptions of future selves appear to share characteristics
with perceptions of others. Pronin et al. (2008) found that people
predicted their preferences in the future would resemble those of
others more so than their own preferences, suggesting that future
selves are perceived as socially distinct others, i.e., along a con-
tinuum of social distance. In a study by Ersner-Hershfield et al.
(2009), photographs of participants were age-processed to make
them look older. Showing participants photos of their future
selves was intended to make the future selves more familiar to
participants, thus making them socially closer. This task manip-
ulation was found to cause preferences for delayed rewards to
go up. Similarly, in a set of studies by Bartels and Rips (2010),
TABLE 1 | Selected studies showing increased neural activity in the self-other overlap when observing/inferring feelings of socially close vs. distant
others.
Study Feeling Contrast Self-other overlap Paradigm
Singer et al., 2006 Pain Fair > unfair others AI and ACC Cues for shocks to others
Xu et al., 2009 Pain Racial ingroup > outgroup ACC Pain to others (visual stimuli)
Cheng et al., 2010 Pain Loved one > stranger AI and ACC Pain to others (visual stimuli)
Hein et al., 2010 Pain Football team ingroup > outgroup AI Helping others in pain
Azevedo et al., 2013 Pain Racial ingroup > outgroup AI Pain to others (visual stimuli)
Contreras-Huerta et al., 2013 Pain Racial ingroup > outgroup AI and ACC Pain to others (visual stimuli)
Beeney et al., 2011 Social rejection Close > distant friend ACC Ball toss exclusion game
Meyer et al., 2013 Social rejection Friend > stranger ACC and AI Ball toss exclusion game
Mobbs et al., 2009 Reward Self-similar > dissimilar other VS and vmPFC Card guessing game
Braams et al., 2014a Reward Self and friend > antagonist VS Gambling task
Braams et al., 2014b Reward Friend > stranger VS Gambling task
Molenberghs et al., 2014 Reward Game ingroup > outgroup VS and vmPFC Giving money to others
Varnum et al., 2014 Reward Self > friend VS Card guessing game
AI, anterior insula; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; VS, ventral striatum.
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participants were asked to rate how socially close they felt to
future selves (operationalised by the authors as “psychological
connectedness”.) Participants felt socially closer to future selves
who were nearer in the future, and the closer they felt to future
selves, the more they preferred delayed rewards in a temporal
discounting task.
In a novel task by Jones and Rachlin (2009), participants per-
formed a “social discounting” task in which participants chose
between rewards for themselves or larger rewards for others
across a range of social distances. The authors observed that peo-
ple who preferred larger rewards for socially distant others more
than smaller rewards for themselves were the same people who
preferred delayed rewards in a temporal discounting task. This
indicates that people’s perceptions of the social and temporal dis-
tance of reward recipients are closely related, corroborating the
findings of Bartels and Rips (2010).
To sum up, these findings collectively suggest that as the
delay of a reward increases, the social distance of the future
self recipient increases, and this corresponds with a decrease in
the subjective value of rewards for them. As mentioned, stud-
ies of simulating others have shown that increasing the social
distance of others reduces SE for them. If this effect applies
to future selves, then increasing their social/temporal distance
(by increasing reward delay) should reduce SE for them also.
These delay-induced reductions in SE for future selves might
lead to rewards for them being valued less, thus explaining
why rewards are discounted with delay. This is the first crit-
ical mechanism of the simulation-based model of intertem-
poral preferences (SMIP), of which social distance is a key
parameter.
The idea that simulation of others is analogous to simula-
tion of future selves, and that the proximity of others/future
selves modulates this simulation, has previously been put for-
ward by Jamison and Wegener (2010). Here, we extend this
idea, going into greater detail on the psychological mechanisms
involved.
Effects of Social Distance on Simulation
Accuracy
Interestingly, compared to SE, social distance appears to have the
opposite effect on SA (i.e., social distance appears to facilitate
the suppression of egocentric bias). Recently, Tamir and Mitchell
(2013) showed that when predicting the preferences of others (in
terms of attitudes, hobbies etc.), egocentric bias in the form of
self-similar responses was elicited only by socially close (i.e., simi-
lar) others. This finding suggests that in contrast to SE, increasing
social distance increases SA. Savitsky et al. (2011) observed a sim-
ilar effect using the Director task, finding that participants were
less able to disengage from their own visual perspective when
the director was socially close compared to distant. These two
studies suggest that for socially close others, egocentric errors
arising from simulation are more prevalent than for distant oth-
ers. The ability to suppress egocentric biases is thus higher for
more socially distant others, suggesting that SA is higher formore
socially distant others.
The findings mentioned in the previous section demon-
strate a clear relationship between SE and intertemporal choices,
i.e., higher SE is associated with greater preference for delayed
rewards. It is less clear how SA for future selves might affect
these preferences, but a reasonable proposition can be formu-
lated. In intertemporal choices, the self perspective (favored by
egocentric bias) is that of the immediate self. From this per-
spective, delayed rewards have to be waited for; a cost that
diminishes their subjective value. This cost-of-waiting does not
exist from the perspective of future selves who are at the right
point in time to receive delayed rewards instantly. Egocen-
tric bias in intertemporal choices can therefore be considered
to reduce preferences for delayed rewards. The ability to sup-
press this bias should see an increase in preferences for delayed
rewards. As discussed, the ability to suppress this egocentric bias
(consequently, SA) increases for more socially distant others.
Extending this to future selves, increasing the social/temporal
distance of future selves (by increasing reward delay) should
increase SA for them, consequently increasing preferences for
delayed rewards. This is the second critical mechanism of the
SMIP.
Investigations of the neural correlates of ToMhave identified a
potentially important brain region for SA. Correct responding in
false-belief ToM tasks relies on egocentric bias suppression skills,
and these responses are reported to robustly increase activation in
the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) (Saxe and Kanwisher,
2003; Brass et al., 2009). Transcranial magnetic stimulation dis-
ruption of rTPJ processing causes ToM task performance decre-
ments (Costa et al., 2008; Young et al., 2010), and enhancing rTPJ
processing using anodal transcranial direct current stimulation
improves Director task performance (Santiesteban et al., 2012).
These studies suggest that neural processing in the rTPJ during
false-belief ToM judgements is related to SA.
In keeping with the SMIP’s assumption that SA increases with
social distance, two studies have reported increased neural activ-
ity in the rTPJ for strangers compared to friends when inferring
the pain of others (Cheng et al., 2010), and when making reward
choices on their behalf (Braams et al., 2014b). Neural signals
related to SA thus appear to be more readily elicited by socially
distant compared to close others, in keeping with the predictions
of the SMIP.
In spite of the central role of SA in intertemporal choices pro-
posed by the SMIP, the rTPJ has not been commonly cited as
a neural correlate of temporal discounting. One possible reason
for this is that compared to false-belief ToM tasks, where SA is
required throughout, temporal discounting trials require SA (and
related rTPJ processing) in only a narrow subset of trials. Inmany
temporal discounting trials, people can easily state preferences
using readily available personal heuristics, e.g., “would you pre-
fer £99 now or £100 in a year?”—this small difference in value
could easily be recognized as not worth the wait. SA processes
of the rTPJ might only be engaged when preferences are difficult
to state and require additional information on predicted future
states. fMRI studies have investigated this issue by comparing tri-
als in which preferences were difficult vs. when they were easily
stated, and in these contrasts increased activity in brain regions
encompassing the rTPJ is reported, in the right intraparietal sul-
cus (Monterosso et al., 2007; Meade et al., 2011), inferior parietal
cortex (Stoeckel et al., 2013), and angular gyrus (Hoffmann et al.,
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2008). On the basis of these findings, it is reasonable to infer
that when decision-making requires information about future
affective states, involvement of brain regions related to SA is
observed. We note, however, that this line of argument based
on fMRI data uses reverse inference, and is only mentioned here
to address potentially similar reverse inferential criticism of the
model (e.g., if the rTPJ is involved in simulation, and simulation
is involved in intertemporal discounting, then why is the rTPJ
not commonly reported as a neural correlate of intertemporal
discounting).
In unpublished data (O’Connell et al., in-preparation), we
used fMRI to measure individuals’ magnitude of activity in the
rTPJ during false-belief ToM judgements, which has been posi-
tively related to performance accuracy in this task (Gweon et al.,
2012; Dodell-Feder et al., 2014). This putative index of SA was
found to be higher in people with greater preferences for delayed
rewards in a temporal discounting task, directly supporting the
predictions of the SMIP.
Simulation-Based Model of Intertemporal
Preferences (SMIP)
From the discussed studies, two effects of social distance on
simulation of others can be identified. Namely, increasing the
social distance of others reduces SE for them (Effect 1), and
increasing the social distance of others increases SA for them
(Effect 2). We have also discussed evidence from studies of
intertemporal choice suggesting that delay increases the social
distance of future selves, allowing Effect 1 to be readily applied to
intertemporal choices. Above, we postulate how Effect 2 operates
in intertemporal choices. In contrast to Effect 1, Effect 2 leads
to the counter-intuitive prediction that increasing the delay on
larger-than-immediate rewards increases certain aspects of its
subjective value, i.e., by reducing perceived costs-of-waiting via
increased SA.
Put more simply, the SMIP explains the temporal discount-
ing phenomenon as the result of two opposing forces of sim-
ulation on the subjective value of delayed rewards (Figure 2).
In Effect 1, increasing the delay of rewards decreases SE for
future selves, reducing the subjective value of delayed rewards.
In Effect 2, increasing the delay of rewards increases the sup-
pression of egocentric bias (and hence increases SA) for future
selves, increasing the subjective value of delayed rewards. Since
temporal discounting results in a net reduction in the subjec-
tive value of rewards with increasing delay, this model must
assume that the rate at which Effect 1 reduces subjective value
is greater than the rate at which Effect 2 increases it. Note that
while SE and SA are oppositely modulated by social distance, they
both share a positive relationship with preferences for delayed
rewards.
The SMIP makes readily testable predictions. If validated, it
would provide the delay-sensitive mechanism to empathizing
with future selves in intertemporal choices proposed by Loewen-
stein (1996). The model’s central idea that the ability to simulate
governs intertemporal preferences has an appealing experimental
upshot; temporal discounting might be used to index individual
differences in simulation capacities. This prospect is appealing for
the following reasons:
FIGURE 2 | Heuristic of SE and SA effects on temporal discounting.
(1) Existing measures of the ability to simulate others are often
only sensitive to one component, either SE (e.g., self-other
pain paradigm), or SA (e.g., false-belief ToM tasks, the
Director task). The SMIP suggests that individual temporal
discounting functions are the product of both components,
thus providing a composite empirical metric of simulation
capacity.
(2) The subjective value of amounts of money can be param-
eterised by their objective worth. This feature of monetary
versions of temporal discounting tasks provides a means for
standardizing subjective experiences, which allows for tight
comparisons between individuals in their ability to simu-
late others by mapping the simulated feeling (of value) on
a monetary scale.
(3) Practically, the temporal discounting task is fast (∼8min),
easy to perform (simple reward choices), and makes low
demands on verbal abilities, all of which allow it to be used
effectively across a wide range of developmental and clinical
populations.
One prediction of the hypothesis that rewards are temporally
discounted because of reductions in SE for future selves (Effect
1), is that people should discount rewards more rapidly when
SE is low, as is supposedly the case when simulating socially
distant others. As briefly mentioned, we provided support for
this hypothesis by showing that people discount for distant oth-
ers more steeply than self or close others (O’Connell et al.,
2013). Individuals who scored high in trait empathy were also
found to discount less for distant others compared to those
who scored low. Note that trait empathy has been positively
associated with SE in terms of neural responses in the self-
other pain paradigm (Singer et al., 2004; Akitsuki and Decety,
2009). These findings indicate that trait empathy is a correlate
of SE, suggesting the possibility that in our results, temporal dis-
counting for distant others was affected by individual differences
in SE.
Two further lines of research deserve mention in their con-
tribution to the evidence-base for the SMIP, and their potential
importance for future evaluations of the model.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 March 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 94
O’Connell et al. The role of simulation in intertemporal choices
Development of ToM and Intertemporal
Preferences
Initial work directly testing the relationship between ToM and
intertemporal preferences came from Thompson et al. (1997).
Their results showed that in four-year-old children, accuracy in
the false-belief ToM task was positively related to preferences for
delayed rewards (stickers). In a similar recent study by Marchetti
et al. (2014), temporal discounting (with sweets) was found to
be more predictive of performance on the ToM task than age,
with children who were more patient scoring better on a first
order false-belief task. These findings are in line with the SMIP’s
assumption that a greater SA capacity (which involves a greater
capacity to inhibit egocentric bias) for others extends to future
selves, promoting the subjective value of rewards for them. How-
ever, Metcalf and Atance (2011) found only a marginal relation-
ship between ToM task performance and the ability to delay
gratification in children aged between 3 and 5 years old. In sum-
mary, developmental studies largely show a positive relationship
between false-belief ToM accuracy and preferences for delayed
rewards.
ToM and Intertemporal Preferences in
Neuropsychiatric Conditions
People diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASC) are
marked by deficits in false-belief ToM task performance (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985), possibly due to a reduced ability to simulate
others (Oberman and Ramachandran, 2007). The current model
predicts that such simulation deficits should cause people with
ASC to discount delayed rewards more steeply than neurotypi-
cal controls. Although reward processing has been widely studied
in ASC (Chevallier et al., 2012), surprisingly there is no avail-
able temporal discounting data on adults diagnosed with ASC.
Three studies have measured temporal discounting in children
and adolescents with ASC, one finding evidence of more impul-
sive choice preferences in ASC (Chantiluke et al., 2014), and two
non-independent studies reporting no evidence of abnormal dis-
counting compared to typically developing controls (Demurie
et al., 2011, 2013). However, it should be noted that in these latter
null findings, the longest delay used (2 weeks) was much shorter
than is common in temporal discounting tasks (>6 months).
Such short delays might not tax temporal discounting-
related processes enough to flag-up potential abnormalities
in ASC.
Another clinical condition marked by deficits in ToM is
schizophrenia (Brüne, 2005; Bora et al., 2009). Shamay-Tsoory
et al. (2007) have reported that ToM deficits are more pro-
nounced for inferring the feelings vs. beliefs states of others in
this group. In addition, the volume of the vmPFC—a brain region
implicated in simulating the mental states of others (Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2006; Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz, 2007)—
has been positively related to scores on a range of ToM mea-
sures in people with schizophrenia (Hooker et al., 2011). These
findings suggest that the ability to infer the feelings of others is
disrupted in people with schizophrenia. According to the SMIP,
such a deficit would be expected to coincide with steeper tempo-
ral discounting, which has been consistently reported in people
with schizophrenia (Heerey et al., 2007, 2011; Gold et al., 2008;
Ahn et al., 2011).
Summary
In this article, we examine the role of simulation, as used to
infer the feeling of others as well as our future selves, in making
intertemporal choices. Specifically, we propose how two distinct
components within simulation, simulation accuracy (SA) and
simulation efficacy (SE) influence intertemporal choices. These
components are influenced differentially by social distance, but
are similarly modulated by delay when making choices for future
selves. The resulting theoretical framework, called the SMIP, lays
out clear empirical predictions. If these predictions are validated,
the SMIP can lead to new lab-based measures to characterize the
social cognitive deficits in psychopathological conditions such as
ASC and schizophrenia.
Acknowledgments
For this work, BC was supported by Medical Research Council
UK. AC was supported by Human Frontiers Science Program.
GOC was supported by the University of Reading.
References
Addis, D. R., and Schacter, D. L. (2012). The hippocampus and imagin-
ing the future: where do we stand? Front. Hum. Neurosci. 5:173. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2011.00173
Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T., and Schacter, D. L. (2008). Age-related changes in the
episodic simulation of future events. Psychol. Sci. 19, 33–41. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2008.02043.x
Ahn, W.-Y., Rass, O., Fridberg, D. J., Bishara, A. J., Forsyth, J. K., Breier, A., et al.
(2011). Temporal discounting of rewards in patients with bipolar disorder and
schizophrenia. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 120, 911–921. doi: 10.1037/a0023333
Ainslie, G. (1975). Specious reward: a behavioral theory of impulsiveness and
impulse control. Psychol. Bull. 82, 463–496. doi: 10.1037/h0076860
Akitsuki, Y., and Decety, J. (2009). Social context and perceived agency affects
empathy for pain: an event-related fMRI investigation. Neuroimage 47,
722–734. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.04.091
Ames, D. L., Jenkins, A. C., Banaji, M. R., andMitchell, J. P. (2008). Taking another
person’s perspective increases self-referential neural processing. Psychol. Sci. 19,
642–644. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02135.x
Azevedo, R. T., Macaluso, E., Avenanti, A., Santangelo, V., Cazzato, V., and Agli-
oti, S. M. (2013). Their pain is not our pain: brain and autonomic correlates of
empathic resonance with the pain of same and different race individuals.Hum.
Brain Mapp. 34, 3168–3181. doi: 10.1002/hbm.22133
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., and Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a
“theory of mind”? Cognition 21, 37–46. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8
Bartels, D. M., and Rips, L. J. (2010). Psychological connectedness and intertempo-
ral choice. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 139, 49–69. doi: 10.1037/a0018062
Baumeister, R. F., and Heatherton, T. F. (1996). Self-regulation failure: an
overview. Psychol. Inq. 7, 1–15. doi: 10.1207/s15327965pli0701_1
Bechara, A., and Damasio, A. R. (2005). The somatic marker hypothesis: a
neural theory of economic decision. Games Econ. Behav. 52, 336–372. doi:
10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.010
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 7 March 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 94
O’Connell et al. The role of simulation in intertemporal choices
Beeney, J. E., Franklin, R. G. Jr., Levy, K. N., and Adams, R. B. Jr. (2011). I feel your
pain: emotional closeness modulates neural responses to empathically experi-
enced rejection. Soc. Neurosci. 6, 369–376. doi: 10.1080/17470919.2011.557245
Bora, E., Yucel, M., and Pantelis, C. (2009). Theory of mind impair-
ment in schizophrenia: meta-analysis. Schizophr. Res. 109, 1–9. doi:
10.1016/j.schres.2008.12.020
Braams, B. R., Güijroglu, B., de Water, E., Meuwese, R., Koolschijn, P. C., Peper,
J. S., et al. (2014a). Reward-related neural responses are dependent on the
beneficiary. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 9, 1030–1037. doi: 10.1093/scan/nst077
Braams, B. R., Peters, S., Peper, J. S., Gürog˘lu, B., and Crone, E. A. (2014b). Gam-
bling for self, friends, and antagonists: differential contributions of affective
and social brain regions on adolescent reward processing. Neuroimage 100,
281–289. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.06.020
Brass, M., Ruby, P., and Spengler, S. (2009). Inhibition of imitative behaviour and
social cognition. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 364, 2359–2367. doi:
10.1098/rstb.2009.0066
Brüne, M. (2005). “Theory of Mind” in schizophrenia: a review of the literature.
Schizophr. Bull. 31, 21–42. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbi002
Buckner, R. L., and Carroll, D. C. (2007). Self-projection and the brain. Trends
Cogn. Sci. 11 49–57. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.004
Chantiluke, K., Christakou, A., Murphy, C. M., Giampietro, V., Daly, E. M., Ecker,
C., et al. (2014). Disorder-specific functional abnormalities during temporal
discounting in youth with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD),
Autism and comorbid ADHD and Autism. Psychiatry Res. 223, 113–120. doi:
10.1016/j.pscychresns.2014.04.006
Cheng, Y., Chen, C., Lin, C.-P., Chou, K.-H., and Decety, J. (2010). Love hurts: an
fMRI study. Neuroimage 51, 923–929. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.02.047
Cheng, Y., Lin, C. F., Liu, H. L., Hsu, Y. Y., Lim, K. E., Hung, D., et al. (2007). Exper-
tise modulates the perception of pain in others. Curr. Biol. 17, 1708–1713. doi:
10.1016/j.cub.2007.09.020
Chevallier, C., Kohls, G., Troiani, V., Brodkin, E. S., and Schultz, R. T. (2012).
The social motivation theory of autism. Trends Cogn. Sci. 16, 231–239. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2012.02.007
Contreras-Huerta, L. S., Baker, K. S., Reynolds, K. J., Batalha, L., and Cunnington,
R. (2013). Racial bias in neural empathic responses to pain. PLoS ONE 8:e84001.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0084001
Costa, A., Torriero, S., Oliveri, M., and Caltagirone, C. (2008). Prefrontal and
temporo-parietal involvement in taking others’ perspective: TMS evidence.
Behav. Neurol. 19, 71–74. doi: 10.1155/2008/694632
Demurie, E., Roeyers, H., Baeyens, D., and Sonuga-Barke, E. (2011). Common
alterations in sensitivity to type but not amount of reward in ADHD and
autism spectrum disorders. J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 1152, 1164–1173. doi:
10.1111/j.1469-7610.2010.02374.x
Demurie, E., Roeyers, H., Baeyens, D., and Sonuga-Barke, E. (2013). Domain-
general and domain-specific aspects of temporal discounting in children with
ADHD and autism spectrum disorders (ASD): a proof of concept study. Res.
Dev. Disab. 34, 1870–1880. doi: 10.1016/j.ridd.2013.03.011
Dodell-Feder, D., Tully, L. M., Lincoln, S. H., and Hooker, C. I. (2014). The neu-
ral basis of theory of mind and its relationship to social functioning and social
anhedonia in individuals with schizophrenia.Neuroimage Clin. 4, 154–163. doi:
10.1016/j.nicl.2013.11.006
Epley, N., Morewedge, C. K., and Keysar, B. (2004). Perspective taking in chil-
dren and adults: equivalent egocentrism but differential correction. J. Exp. Soc.
Psychol. 40, 760–768. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2004.02.002
Ersner-Hershfield, H., Wimmer, G. E., and Knutson, B. (2009). Saving for
the future self: neural measures of future self-continuity predict tempo-
ral discounting. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 4, 85–92. doi: 10.1093/scan/
nsn042
Fujita, K. (2008). Seeing the forest beyond the trees: a construal level approach to
self control. Soc. Personal. Psychol. Compass 2, 1475–1496. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-
9004.2008.00118.x
Gold, J. M., Waltz, J. A., Prentice, K. J., Morris, S. E., and Heerey, E. A. (2008).
Reward processing in schizophrenia: a deficit in the representation of value.
Schizophr. Bull. 34, 835–847. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbn068
Gordon, R. (1986). Folk psychology as simulation. Mind Lang. 1, 158–171. doi:
10.1111/j.1468-0017.1986.tb00324.x
Gweon, H., Dodell-Feder, D., Bedny, M., and Saxe, R. (2012). Theory of mind per-
formance in children correlates with functional specialization of a brain region
for thinking about thoughts. Child Dev. 83, 1853–1868. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2012.01829.x
Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., Vann, S. D., and Maguire, E. A. (2007). Patients with
hippocampal amnesia cannot imagine new experiences. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 104, 1726–1731. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0610561104
Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J. T., and Rapson, R. L. (1994). Emotional Contagion. New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Heerey, E. A., Matveeva, T. M., and Gold, J. M. (2011). Imagining the future:
degraded representations of future rewards and events in schizophrenia.
J. Abnorm. Psychol. 120, 483–489. doi: 10.1037/a0021810
Heerey, E. A., Robinson, B. M., McMahon, R. P., and Gold, J. M. (2007).
Delay discounting in schizophrenia. Cogn. Neuropsychiatry 12, 213–221. doi:
10.1080/13546800601005900
Hein, G., Silani, G., Preuschoff, K., Batson, C. D., and Singer, T. (2010).
Neural responses to ingroup and outgroup members’ suffering pre-
dict individual differences in costly helping. Neuron 68, 149–160. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2010.09.003
Hoffmann, W. F., Schwartz, D. L., Huckans, M. S., McFarland, B. H., Meiri, G.,
Stevens, A. A., et al. (2008). Cortical activation during delay discounting in
abstinent methamphetamine dependent individuals. Psychopharmacology 201,
183–193. doi: 10.1007/s00213-008-1261-1
Hooker, C. I., Bruce, L., Lincoln, S. H., Fisher, M., and Vinogradov, S. (2011).
Theory of mind skills are related to gray matter volume in the ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex in schizophrenia. Biol. Psychiatry 70, 1169–1178. doi:
10.1016/j.biopsych.2011.07.027
Jamison, J., andWegener, J. (2010). Multiple selves in intertemporal choice. J. Econ.
Psychol. 31, 832–839. doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2010.03.004
Janowski, V., Camerer, C., and Rangel, A. (2013). Empathic choice involves vmPFC
value signals that are modulated by social processing implemented in IPL. Soc.
Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 8, 201–208. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsr086
Jenkins, A. C., Macrae, C. N., and Mitchell, J. P. (2008). Repetition suppres-
sion of ventromedial prefrontal activity during judgments of self and oth-
ers. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 105, 4507–4512. doi: 10.1073/pnas.07087
85105
Jones, B. A., and Rachlin, H. (2009). Delay, probability and social discounting in
a public goods games. J. Exp. Anal. Behav. 91, 61–73. doi: 10.1901/jeab.2009.
91-61
Jung, D., Sul, S., and Kim, H. (2013). Dissociable neural processes under-
lying risky decisions for self versus other. Front. Neurosci. 7:15. doi:
10.3389/fnins.2013.00015
Keysar, B., Lin, S., and Barr, D. J. (2003). Limits on theory of mind use in adults.
Cognition 89, 25–41. doi: 10.1016/S0010-0277(03)00064-7
Kirby, K. N., Winston, G. C., and Santiesteban, M. (2005). Impatience and grades:
delay-discount rates correlate negatively with college GPA. Learn. Individ.
Differ. 15, 213–222. doi: 10.1016/j.lindif.2005.01.003
Kwan, D., Craver, C. F., Green, L., Myerson, J., Boyer, P., and Rosenbaum,
R. S. (2012). Future decision-making without episodic mental time travel.
Hippocampus 22, 1215–1219. doi: 10.1002/hipo.20981
Kwan, D., Craver, C. F., Green, L., Myerson, J., and Rosenbaum, R. S. (2013). Dis-
sociations in future thinking following hippocampal damage: evidence from
discounting and time perspective in episodic amnesia. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 142,
1355–1369. doi: 10.1037/a0034001
Liviatan, I., Trope, Y., and Liberman, N. (2008). Interpersonal similarity as a social
distance dimension: implications for perception of others’ actions. J. Exp. Soc.
Psychol. 44, 1256–1269. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2008.04.007
Loewenstein, G. (1996). Out of control: visceral influences on behavior. Organ.
Behav. Hum. Decis. Proc. 65, 272–292. doi: 10.1006/obhd.1996.0028
Marchetti, A., Castelli, I., Sanvito, L., and Massaro, D. (2014). Is a bird in the
hand worth two in the future? Intertemporal choice, attachment and theory
of mind in school-aged children. Front. Psychol. 5:483. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.
00483
Martin, V. C., Schacter, D. L., Corballis, M. C., and Addis, D. R. (2011). A role
for the hippocampus in encoding simulations of future events. Neuron 108,
13858–13863. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1105816108
Meade, C. S., Lowen, S. B., MacLean, R. R., Key, M. D., and Lukas, S. E. (2011).
fMRI brain activation during a delay discounting task in HIV-positive adults
with and without cocaine dependence. Psychiatry Res. 192, 167–175. doi:
10.1016/j.pscychresns.2010.12.011
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 8 March 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 94
O’Connell et al. The role of simulation in intertemporal choices
Metcalf, J. L., and Atance, C. M. (2011). Do preschoolers save to benefit their future
selves? Cogn. Dev. 26, 371–382. doi: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2011.09.003
Metcalfe, J., and Mischel, W. (1999). A hot/cool system analysis of delay of grat-
ification: dynamics of willpower. Psychol. Rev. 106, 3–19. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295X.106.1.3
Meyer, M. L., Masten, C. L., Ma, Y., Wang, C., Shi, Z., Eisenberger, N. I., et al.
(2013). Empathy for the social suffering of friends and strangers recruits dis-
tinct patterns of brain activation. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 8, 446–454. doi:
10.1093/scan/nss019
Mischel, W., and Metzner, R. (1962). Preference for delayed reward as a function
of age, intelligence, and length of delay interval. J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol. 64,
425–431. doi: 10.1037/h0045046
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., and Rodriguez, M. (1989). Delay of gratification in
children. Science 244, 933–938. doi: 10.1126/science.2658056
Mitchell, J. P., Schirmer, J., Ames, D. L., and Gilbert, D. T. (2011). Medial pre-
frontal cortex predicts intertemporal choice. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 857–866. doi:
10.1162/jocn.2010.21479
Mobbs, D., Yu, R., Meyer, M., Passamonti, L., Seymour, B., Calder, A. J., et al.
(2009). A key role for similarity in vicarious reward. Science 324, 900. doi:
10.1126/science.1170539
Moffitt, T. E., Arseneault, L., Belsky, D., Dickson, N., Hancox, R. J., Harring-
ton, H., et al. (2011). A gradient of childhood self-control predicts health,
wealth, and public safety. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 108, 2693–2698. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1010076108
Molenberghs, P., Bosworth, R., Nott, Z., Louis, W. R., Smith, J. R., Amiot, C. E.,
et al. (2014). The influence of group membership and individual differences in
psychopathy and perspective taking on neural responses when punishing and
rewarding others. Hum. Brain Mapp. 35, 4989–4999. doi: 10.1002/hbm.22527
Monterosso, J. R., Ainslie, G., Xu, J., Cordova, X., Domier, C. P., and London, E.
D. (2007). Frontoparietal cortical activity of methamphetamine-dependent and
comparison subjects performing a delay discounting task. Hum. Brain Mapp.
28, 383–393. doi: 10.1002/hbm.20281
Morelli, S. A., Sacchet, M. D., and Zaki, J. (2015). Common and distinct neural
correlates of personal and vicarious reward: a meta-analysis. Neuroimage. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.12.056. [Epub ahead of print].
Nicolle, A., Klein-Flügge, M. C., Hunt, L. T., Vlaev, I., Dolan, R. J., and
Behrens, T. E. (2012). An agent independent axis for executed and
modeled choice in medial prefrontal cortex. Neuron 75, 1114–1121. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2012.07.023
Niedenthal, P. M. (2007). Embodying emotion. Science 18, 1002–1005. doi:
10.1126/science.1136930
O’Connell, G., Christakou, A., Haffey, A. T., and Chakrabarti, B. (2013). The role of
empathy in choosing rewards from another’s perspective. Front. Hum. Neurosci.
7:174. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00174
Oberman, L. M., and Ramachandran, V. S. (2007). The simulating social mind:
the role of the mirror neuron system and simulation in the social and commu-
nicative deficits of autism spectrum disorders. Psychol. Bull. 133, 310–327. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.133.2.310
Ochsner, K. N., Knierim, K., Ludlow, D. H., Hanelin, J., Ramachandran, T., Glover,
G., et al. (2004). Reflecting upon feelings: an fMRI study of neural systems
supporting the attribution of emotion to self and other. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 16,
1746–1772. doi: 10.1162/0898929042947829
Osin´ski, J. (2009). Kin altruism, reciprocal altruism and social discounting. Pers.
Individ. Differ. 47, 374–378. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2009.04.011
Packard, M. G., and Knowlton, B. J. (2002). Learning and memory func-
tions of the basal ganglia. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 25, 563–593. doi:
10.1146/annurev.neuro.25.112701.142937
Palombo, D. J., Keane, M.M., and Verfaellie, M. (2014). The medial temporal lobes
are critical for reward-based decision making under conditions that promote
episodic future thinking. Hippocampus 25, 345–353. doi: 10.1002/hipo.22376
Peters, J. (2011). The role of the medial orbitofrontal cortex in intertem-
poral choice: prospection or valuation? J. Neurosci. 31, 5889–5890. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0268-11.2011
Peters, J., and Büchel, C. (2010). Episodic future thinking reduces reward delay dis-
counting through an enhancement of prefrontal-mediotemporal interactions.
Neuron 66, 138–148. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2010.03.026
Pezzulo, G., and Rigoli, F. (2011). The value of foresight: how prospection affects
decision-making. Front. Neurosci. 5:79. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2011.00079
Pronin, E., Olivola, C. Y., and Kennedy, K. A. (2008). Doing unto future selves as
you would do unto others: Psychological distance and decision making. Pers.
Soc. Psych. Bull. 34, 224–236. doi: 10.1177/0146167207310023
Rabin, J. S., Carson, N., Gilboa, A., Stuss, D. T., and Rosenbaum, R. S.
(2013). Imagining other people’s experiences in a person with impaired
episodic memory: the role of personal familiarity. Front. Psychol. 3:588. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00588
Rabin, J. S., and Rosenbaum, R. S. (2012). Familiarity modulates the functional
relationship between theory of mind and autobiographical memory. Neuroim-
age 62, 520–529. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.05.002
Race, E., Keane, M. M., and Verfaellie, M. (2013). Losing sight of the future:
impaired semantic prospection following medial temporal lobe lesions. Hip-
pocampus 23, 268–277. doi: 10.1002/hipo.22084
Rosenbaum, R. S., Stuss, D. T., Levine, B., and Tulving, E. (2007). Theory of Mind
is independent of episodic memory. Science 318, 1257–1257. doi: 10.1126/sci-
ence.1148763
Saarela, M. V., Hlushchuk, Y., Williams, A. C., Schürmann, M., Kalso, E., and
Hari, R. (2007). The compassionate brain: humans detect intensity of pain from
another’s face. Cereb. Cortex 17, 230–237. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhj141
Santiesteban, I., Banissy, M. J., Catmur, C., and Bird, G. (2012). Enhancing social
ability by stimulating right temporoparietal junction. Curr. Biol. 22, 2274–2277.
doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2012.10.018
Savitsky, K., Keysar, B., Epley, N., Carter, T., and Swanson, A. (2011). The
closeness-communication bias: increased egocentrism among friends ver-
sus strangers. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 47, 269–273. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2010.
09.005
Saxe, R., and Kanwisher, N. (2003). People thinking about thinking people. the
role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind.” Neuroimage 19,
1835–1842. doi: 10.1016/S1053-8119(03)00230-1
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., and Buckner, R. L. (2007). Remembering the past to
imagine the future: the prospective brain. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 8, 657–661. doi:
10.1038/nrn2213
Sellitto, M., Ciaramelli, E., and di Pellegrino, G. (2010). Myopic discounting of
future rewards after medial orbitofrontal damage in humans. J. Neurosci. 30,
16429–16436. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2516-10.2010
Sellitto, M., Ciaramelli, E., and di Pellegrino, G. (2011). The neurobiology of
intertemporal choice: insight from imaging and lesion studies. Rev Neurosci.
22, 565–574. doi: 10.1515/RNS.2011.046
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., and Aharon-Peretz, J. (2007). Dissociable prefrontal net-
works for cognitive and affective theory of mind: a lesion study.Neuropsycholo-
gia 45, 3054–3067. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.05.021
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Shur, S., Barcai-Goodman, L., Medlovich, S., Harari, H.,
and Levkovitz, Y. (2007). Dissociation of cognitive from affective compo-
nents of theory of mind in schizophrenia. Psychiatry Res. 149, 11–23. doi:
10.1016/j.psychres.2005.10.018
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Tibi-Elhanany, Y., and Aharon-Peretz, J. (2006). The
ventromedial prefrontal cortex is involved in understanding affective but
not cognitive theory of mind stories. Soc. Neurosci. 1, 149–166. doi:
10.1080/17470910600985589
Shamosh, N. A., DeYoung, C. G., Green, A. E., Reis, D. L., Johnson, M. R., Con-
way, A. R., et al. (2008). Individual differences in delay discounting: relation to
intelligence, working memory, and anterior prefrontal cortex. Psychol. Sci. 19,
904–911. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02175.x
Shanton, K., and Goldman, A. (2010). Simulation theory. Wiley Interdiscip. Rev.
Cogn. Sci. 1, 527–538. doi: 10.1002/wcs.33
Singer, T., Seymour, B., O’Doherty, J. P., Kaube, H., Dolan, R. J., and Frith, C. D.
(2004). Empathy for pain involves the affective but not sensory components of
pain. Science 303, 1157–1162. doi: 10.1126/science.1093535
Singer, T., Seymour, B., O’Doherty, J. P., Stephan, K. E., Dolan, R. J., and Frith, C.
D. (2006). Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness
of others. Nature 439, 466–469. doi: 10.1038/nature04271
Stoeckel, L. E., Murdaugh, D. L., Cox, J. E., Cook, E. W., and Weller, R. E.
(2013). Greater impulsivity is associated with decreased brain activation in
obese women during a delay discounting task. Brain Imaging Behav. 7, 116–128.
doi: 10.1007/s11682-012-9201-4
Suzuki, S., Harasawa, N., Ueno, K., Gardner, J. L., Ichinohe, N., Haruno, M., et al.
(2012). Learning to simulate others’ decisions. Neuron 74, 1125–1137. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2012.04.030
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 9 March 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 94
O’Connell et al. The role of simulation in intertemporal choices
Tamir, D. I., and Mitchell, J. P. (2013). Anchoring and adjustment during social
inferences. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 142, 151–162. doi: 10.1037/a0028232
Thompson, C., Barresi, J., and Moore, C. (1997). The development of future-
oriented prudence and altruism in preschoolers. Cogn. Dev. 12, 199–212. doi:
10.1016/S0885-2014(97)90013-7
Varnum, M. E., Shi, Z., Chen, A., Qiu, J., and Han, S. (2014). When “Your”
reward is the same as “My” reward: self-construal priming shifts neu-
ral responses to own vsfriends’ rewards. Neuroimage 87, 164–169. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.10.042
Wimmer, H., and Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: representation and
constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of
deception. Cognition 13, 103–128. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5
Xu, X., Zuo, X., Wang, X., and Han, S. (2009). Do you feel my pain? Racial group
membership modulates empathic neural responses. J. Neurosci. 29, 8525–8529.
doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2418-09.2009
Young, L., Camprodon, J., Hauser, M., Pascual-Leone, A., and Saxe, R. (2010).
Disruption of the right temporo-parietal junction with transcranial magnetic
stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgment. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 107, 6753–6758. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0914826107
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 O’Connell, Christakou and Chakrabarti. This is an open-access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC
BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 10 March 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 94
